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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
lawful" and that one who, in attempting to commit suicide, kills another is
guilty of manslaughter prevails. Commonwealth v. Mink (1878) 123 Mass.
422; State v. Lindsey, supra.
The cases are also divided as to the effect of suicide pacts and of one person
aiding another to commit suicide. It is generally recognized that if two
persons encourage each other to commit suicide jointly and one succeeds
and the other fails in the attempt upon himself, the survivor is guilty of the
murder of the other. Even in states where suicide itself is not a crime this
result is reached. Blackburn v. Ohio (1872) 23 Ohio St. 146; Burnett v.
People (1903) 204 Ill. 208, 68 N. E. 505. One who furnishes another with
means for committing suicide at the latter's request may be guilty of murder.
People v. Roberts (1920) 211 Mich. 187, 178 N. W. 690; Commonwealth v.
Bowen (1816) 13 Mass. 356. Contra to these decisions is Sanders v. State
(1908) 54 Tex. Cr. Rep. 101, 112 S. W. 68, holding that since it is not a
violation of law for a person to commit suicide, one furnishing another the
means to the commission of suicide violates no law. E. M. H., '35.
MOTOR VEHICLES-REGISTRATION.-In the recent case of Furtado v.
Humphrey (Popkin v. Same, Warren v. Same) 188 N. E. 391, decided Dec. 28,
1933, Massachusetts has gone even farther in extending her peculiar doctrine
of the necessity of proper registration of automobiles in order to avoid the
taint of outlawry on the highways. Gen. Laws of Mass. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90,
paragraphs 2, 9. This doctrine- which allows the owner of an "improperly"
registered car no recovery for personal injuries or for injuries to his car
although a clear case of negligence exists against a third party seems to be
well established in Massachusetts. Dudley v. Northampton St. Ry. (1909)
202 Mass. 443, 89 N. E. 25; Hanson v. Culton (1929) 269 Mass. 471, 169
N. E. 272. However, Georgia is the only one of a number of states having
similar registration statutes that follows the "outlawry" interpretation.
17 Iowa Law Rev. (1931) 1. c. 95, n. 4; 96, n. 6. There have been several
articles and notes containing well-directed criticism of the Massachusetts
rule. 17 Iowa Law Rev. (1931) 94; 95 Cent. L. J. 274 (1922) ; 32 Yale L. J.
394 (1922) ; 38 Harv. L. R. 531 (1924).
The case of Furtado v. Humphrey extends the doctrine of "outlawry" by
more strictly construing what shall constitute "proper registration." In
that case a Mr. Popkin, one of three partners, registered a truck owned
by the partnership under the following title, "United Produce Co. by B.
Popkin." In answering one of the statements required to be made under
the penalties of perjury-"Is this vehicle owned by you individually?"-
Popkin said "Yes"; and he did not answer "Yes" or "No" to the question-
"Or is it owned jointly or by a cooperative association or corporation?" The
court held that inasmuch as the Statute required that "application for the
registration of motor vehicles and trailers may be made by the owner thereof"
and as this requirement of statement of ownership is a matter made vital
by the Statute to be strictly construed the registration being in Popkin's
name alone when he was only joint owner, the truck was improperly reg-
istered (outlawed) and therefore Popkin, his partner, and the partnership
chauffeur could not recover for personal injuries and damages to the truck
although the defendant admits that "there was evidence upon which the
jury could have found him negligent." (Not only the owner of an improp-
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erly registered vehicle but also one who knows or ought to know of the im-
proper registration is precluded from recovery. G. L., c. 90, para. 9.)
It is interesting to note that one of the two cases (Nash v. Lang (1929) 268
Mass. 407, 167 N. E. 762) relied upon by the Court for the doctrine of "strict
compliance" is directly contrary to such an idea. There the Court held the
registration to be proper though the applicant answered the question "From
where did you purchase the vehicle?" incorrectly. The Court said the
answer "did not affect the main purpose of registration which is to afford
identification of the owner and of the motor vehicle." In Harlow v. Sinman
(1922) 241 Mass. 462, 135 N. E. 553, the Court allowed recovery though the
plaintiff was driving a car registered in her own name alone when the
ownership was held in common with her daughter. In Crompton v. Williams
(1913) 216 Mass. 184, 103 N. E. 298, the Court held a registration by the
owner in the trade name of his company valid where the name was well
known and the purpose was not concealment. (In the Furtado case the
Court intimated if Popkin had been sole owner the registration in "United
Produce Co." would have been valid.) In Bacon v. Boston Elevated (1926)
256 Mass. 30, 152 N. E. 35, a married woman's registration in her maiden
name was held invalid, but here the purpose was concealment, according to
the Court, as the woman was known only by her married name.
But the courts have been Draconian in such decisions as Kilduff v. Boston
Elevated (1924) 247 Mass. 453, 142 N. E. 98, and Hanley v. American Ry.
Exp. (1923) 244 Mass. 248, 138 N. E. 323, and so there is precedent for the
strict compliance exacted in the Furtado case. However, if the purpose is,
as the Court has said in the principal case, "to afford easy identification of
the owner of the motor vehicle involved in an accident 'and' to avoid am-
biguous or confusing registration," it is hard to see why the courts should
be so ready to thrust such a dire penalty upon owners of cars and others
when the vehicles may have been registered in good faith and in a manner
sufficient to reveal to the Commonwealth who are the owners. Apparently
the courts are content to overturn all sense of justice merely to render the
identification of vehicles "easier." T. C., '35.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CoNsTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMITATION-The de-
fendant owned and operated its own light plant and public waterworks. The
plant produced a net profit of $10,000 per year which went into the general
fund of the town. The board of trustees entered into an agreement with
Fairbanks-Morse & Co. for the purchase of two engines and other equipment.
A down payment was provided and the balance in monthly installments. The
board passed an ordinance providing for the payment of pledge orders out of
the net earnings of the plant only; the indebtedness was not to be a general
obligation of the town. The plaintiff, a taxpayer, seeks to restrain the de-
fendant from carrying out the terms of the agreement. Held: The general
indebtedness of the town is increased by the contract beyond the constitu-
tional limitation and the authorizing ordinance is consequently void. Reimer
v. Town of Holyoke (Colo. 1933) 27 Pac. (2d) 1032.
State constitutions universally provide a limit of indebtedness beyond
which a municipality cannot go. 1 Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed.
1911) 337. The purpose of these provisions is to prevent the abuse of the
corporate credit and the burdensome taxation which would necessarily re-
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